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Abstract 
This essay argues that New Zealand’s courts, when 
considering constitutional matters on which there is no 
domestic jurisprudence, should draw upon foreign 
jurisprudence where the principles informing foreign judicial 
decisions on similar subject-matter are principles of the New 
Zealand legal system. This essay explores this idea with 
reference to the principle of “constitutional dialogue”, which 
legitimises judicial orders that suspend declarations of 
constitutional invalidity thereby giving temporary effect to 
unconstitutional statutes. It first explains how “constitutional 
dialogue” can both describe and lend legitimacy to the 
interactions between the executive, legislature and judiciary 
in New Zealand. Drawing upon the Canadian, South African 
and Hong Kong “suspension order” jurisprudence, it then 
explains how these orders facilitate a “dialogue” between the 
different branches of government. Finally, the essay criticises 
the New Zealand High Court’s decision in Spencer v 
Attorney General in which the Court held that the Human 
Rights Tribunal could not grant “suspension orders” that 
validated unlawful government policies. In particular, the 
essay focuses on the Judge’s failure to recognise 
“constitutional dialogue” as the principle that underlies the 
decision to grant these orders in foreign jurisdictions, which 
would have allowed her Honour to follow Canadian authority 
when reaching her decision.  
 
Constitutional dialogue – suspension order – temporary 
declaration of validity – Spencer v Attorney General – 
constitutional law – comparative law  
 
The text of this paper (excluding the cover page, table of 
contents, keywords, abstract, footnotes and bibliography) 
consists of exactly 15,006 words. 
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I Introduction  
“Constitutional dialogue” is a constitutional law principle 
used to explain and lend democratic legitimacy to the 
interactions between the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government when they act to uphold the 
Constitution. This essay works towards the conclusion this 
principle should inform the New Zealand courts’ approach to 
crafting remedial responses to constitutional issues.  
 
Section II will explain how “constitutional dialogue” 
developed out of a need to lend democratic legitimacy to 
judicial review of legislation under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. In then details how academics have 
adapted “constitutional dialogue” from the Canadian 
constitutional context to describe and legitimise the 
relationship between the branches of government in 
traditional Westminster systems, such as New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom.  
 
Section III will focus on the Canadian innovation of judicial 
orders that suspend declarations of constitutional invalidity 
thereby giving temporary effect to unconstitutional statutes. 
These “suspension orders” have been utilised in Canada, 
South Africa and Hong Kong. The essay will discuss how 
these orders have become a tool to facilitate “constitutional 
dialogue” and how they can be better crafted to achieve that 
purpose.   
 
Section IV will criticise the recent New Zealand High Court 
decision in Spencer v Attorney General in which the Court 
held that the Human Rights Tribunal could not use a 
suspension order to validate an unlawful government policy. 
In reaching its decision the Court failed to recognise that the 
principle of “constitutional dialogue” underlies the decision 
to grant these orders in foreign jurisdictions. The essay 
explains how both the principle of “constitutional dialogue” 
and the foreign jurisprudence surrounding “suspension 
orders” could have assisted the Court in reaching its decision.  
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II “Constitutional Dialogue” 
A Judicial review of legislation 
The term “constitutional dialogue” originates from Hogg and 
Bushell’s 1997 article that responds to the argument that 
judicial review of legislation under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Charter) is illegitimate because it is 
undemocratic. 1  That argument maintained that judicial 
review under the Charter permitted unaccountable and 
unelected judges to strike down the laws created by 
democratically elected representatives of the Canadian 
people.2 Hogg and Bushell believed that if judicial review 
were conceived as a “constitutional dialogue” between judges 
and legislatures, then it could be leant democratic 
legitimacy.3 Thus, when legislation can reverse, modify or 
avoid a judicial decision that strikes down a piece of 
legislation on Charter grounds this can facilitate a 
“constitutional dialogue”.4 In other words, a “constitutional 
dialogue” occurs when the legislature has the ability to 
consider the judicial decision that strikes down the legislation 
and is able to decide how to respond to that decision.5 
 
“Constitutional dialogue” strikes a middle ground between 
judicial supremacy and parliamentary supremacy. The 
essential idea is that the courts and legislatures participate in 
a “dialogue” that seeks to achieve the right balance between 
constitutional principles and public policies. Both the courts 
and legislatures are equally responsible for making decisions 
about the Constitution’s meaning. The courts interpret and 
protect the rights contained in the Constitution as a result of 
adjudicating disputes relating to past conduct. The legislature 
is responsible for creating laws that regulate future conduct 
within the limits set by the Constitution. Because the courts 
and legislatures bring expertise from these different 
                                               
1 Peter W Hogg and Allison A Bushell “The Charter Dialogue between 
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a 
Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75 at 77. 
2 At 77. 
3 At 79. 
4 At 79. 
5 At 82. 
LAWS526 Research Essay 
 
6 
 
backgrounds, they can listen and learn from each other’s 
perspectives of what the Constitution means.6 For a charter 
instrument to facilitate “constitutional dialogue” it needs to 
recognise both the shared and different roles that legislatures 
and courts play in constructing and understanding rights, and 
in balancing rights against social and economic goals. 
Importantly, the charter needs to be able to leave decisions 
about social, economic and public policy with the 
legislature.7 
 
Hogg and Bushell argue that the Charter facilitates this 
“dialogue” in a number of ways. First, s 1 guarantees the 
rights protected by the Charter subject only to “such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” In R v Oakes the 
Supreme Court set out the standards that a law must meet to 
satisfy the s 1 justification. First, the law must pursue a 
sufficiently important objective. Second, the law must be 
rationally connected with the objective. Third, the law must 
impair the right no more than necessary to accomplish the 
objective. Fourth, there must be proportionality between the 
effects caused by the law’s limitation of the right and the 
object that the law achieves.8 Generally, a law is struck down 
because it impairs the right more than necessary to achieve 
the objective. Upon striking down the law, the Court will 
explain why the s 1 standard has not been met, which will 
also involve providing a more rights-friendly alternative 
measure that could have satisfied the s 1 standard. A 
“dialogue” occurs when the legislature considers the Court’s 
s 1 analysis and its alternative measure when substituting the 
invalid law for one that better respects the Charter while 
achieving the same substantive legislative purpose.9  
                                               
6  Anne Meuwese and Marnix Snel “Constitutional Dialogue: An 
Overview” (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 123 at 128-129.  
7  George Williams “A Community-Based Bill of Rights” in Tom 
Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds) Protecting 
Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2003) 247 at 249-250.  
8 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-139.  
9  Hogg and Bushell “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures”, above n 1, at 84-87. 
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Section 33 of the Charter also facilitates a “dialogue”. It 
contains an override power that enables the legislature to 
override the guarantees in the Charter provisions that protect 
rights of expression and rights relating to legal processes. A 
Charter-inconsistent law can remain in force if Parliament re-
enacts the legislation and expressly declares that the 
legislation is to continue to operate notwithstanding being 
invalidated under the Charter. This makes any judicial 
decision that strikes down legislation on Charter grounds 
suspensory only. 10  Parliament’s power is subject to a 
temporal restriction, which means that its declaration will 
expire at the end of five years, forcing Parliament to 
reconsider the invalidated legislation. 11  Section 33 
intentionally allows for a legislative response to a court’s 
Charter decision. Because the court’s decision does not veto 
the legislation, but rather suspends its operation pending re-
enactment, this allows for the commencement of a dialogue 
with the legislative branch.12  
 
But the “dialogue” can also occur when a Canadian 
legislature responds to a judicial decision by repealing the 
unconstitutional law. By actively repealing unconstitutional 
legislation the legislature is signalling to the Court that it 
agrees with the Court’s interpretation of the legislation and 
that the legislature should not have adopted this law in the 
first place. 
 
Hogg and Bushell’s article surveyed the legislative responses 
to all the cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada had 
struck down a law on Charter grounds prior to 1997. The 
legislature responded to the judicial decision in 52 of those 
65 cases. In 44 cases, legislatures substituted a new, Charter-
consistent law for the old one.13 In seven cases, legislatures 
actively repealed the offending law but did not substitute the 
                                               
10 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed supplemented, vol 
2, Carswell) at [36.4(d)]. 
11 At [39.4]. 
12 At [36.5(a)]. 
13  Hogg and Bushell “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures”, above n 1, at 97. 
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law with new legislation.14 Only in two cases did a legislature 
override the Court’s decision.15 Hogg and Bushell concluded 
that the Charter should not be thought of as imposing a veto 
on the legislative policies of the democratically elected 
representatives of the people, but rather as a “dialogue” 
between the judicial and legislative branches as to how to 
best reconcile the rights enshrined in the Charter with the 
accomplishment of the community’s desired social and 
economic goals.16 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted Hogg and 
Bushell’s view of “constitutional dialogue” in several cases.17 
One example is contained in the majority judgment of 
Iacobucci and Cory JJ in Vriend v Alberta. The judges noted 
that the Courts, due to their independence, are mandated to 
make reasoned and principled decisions dictated by the 
Constitution even if such decisions are not supported by the 
majority. However, in carrying out that task, judges may not 
make value judgments about policy decisions, as this is the 
role of legislatures. The judges that respect the role of 
legislatures ensure that legislatures respect the role of the 
judges. Mutual respect between the legislature and judiciary 
is expressed in the features of the Charter that facilitate 
“dialogue”, namely judicial review of legislation. The work 
of the legislature is reviewed by the Courts and the work of 
the Court in its decisions can be reacted to by the legislature. 
Consequently, this “dialogue” has the benefit of making the 
different branches of government accountable to each other, 
which enhances the democratic process.18 Justices Iacobucci 
and Cory’s comments shed light on the fact that 
“constitutional dialogue” recognises that a relationship of 
reciprocity and mutual respect exists between the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government.  
 
                                               
14 At 97. 
15 At 97. 
16 At 105. 
17 See, for example, Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 and Corbiere v 
Canada [1999] 2 SCR 203.  
18 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 at [136] - [139]. 
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What is important to emphasise is that the “dialogue” theory 
is not a theory of judicial review or about justifying judicial 
review of legislation. The justification of judicial review rests 
on moral, political and legal grounds.19 What the “dialogue” 
principle does do is it exposes judicial review under the 
Charter as weaker than previously supposed. It shows that it 
is not a strong type of judicial review because it allows 
Parliament to have the last word. Therefore, “constitutional 
dialogue’ lends Charter review democratic legitimacy.20 
B “Constitutional dialogue” in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand 
It appears from the preceding discussion that “constitutional 
dialogue” serves two functions in Canada: first, it explains 
the relationship between the branches of government when 
engaging in the protection of constitutional rights and second, 
it lends democratic legitimacy to judicial review of 
legislation under the Charter. Can “constitutional dialogue” 
exist in the United Kingdom and New Zealand? These two 
countries have Westminster systems of Government where 
the courts do not have the power to invalidate legislation on 
the basis that it is inconsistent with a supreme law human 
rights instrument. 
1 The explanatory function of “constitutional dialogue” 
There is academic support for the notion that “constitutional 
dialogue” can explain the interaction between the branches of 
government in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.  
 
The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 (UKHRA) 
was heavily modelled on the Canadian Charter. 21  The 
UKHRA requires inter alia the Courts to interpret legislation, 
as far as possible, in a way which is compatible with the 
rights contained in the European Convention on Human 
                                               
19 Peter Hogg, Allison Bushell Thronton and Wade K Wright “Charter 
Dialogue Revisited – or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45 
Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 28.  
20 At 28-29.  
21 Richard Clayton QC “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: 
The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 
1998” [2004] PL 33 at 45. 
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Rights (Convention). 22  If it is impossible to interpret the 
legislation so as to make it compatible with the Convention, 
the judges cannot strike the legislation down. The courts can 
only issue a declaration of incompatibility.23 A declaration of 
incompatibility sends a signal from the courts to Parliament 
that the United Kingdom might be breaching its obligations 
under the Convention. This does not, however, require 
Parliament to change the law.  
 
Clayton believes that the Canadian dialogic approach could 
be used to explain adjudication under the UKHRA.24 Like the 
Canadian Charter, the UKHRA is designed to prevent the 
courts from having the final word on human rights issues.25 
Clayton argues that the principle of “constitutional dialogue” 
is implicit in two structural features of the UKHRA. First, the 
opportunity for “dialogue” arises where a Court is unable to 
interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with the 
Convention and consequently makes a declaration of 
incompatibility. 26  Second, the Courts are able to reach a 
strained interpretation of a piece of legislation that might not 
give effect to Parliament’s intention. This leaves open the 
ability for Parliament to enact new legislation that modifies 
the court’s s 3 interpretation.27 Both features result in judicial 
decisions under the UKHRA prompting a legislative 
response.28  
 
In New Zealand, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) 
arguably facilitates the same kind of “dialogue”. The courts 
must interpret legislation consistently with the rights 
enshrined in BORA where there is a rights-consistent 
meaning available.29 Furthermore, although not enshrined in 
the legislation, there is some suggestion from case law that 
                                               
22 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1) (UK).  
23 Human Rights Act 1998, s 4 (UK).  
24 Clayton, above n 21, at 41. 
25 At 45. 
26 At 46. 
27 At 46. 
28 At 47. 
29 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. 
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New Zealand courts have the implied power to formally 
declare that legislation is inconsistent with BORA.30 
 
But is Clayton really correct that the “dialogue” concept can 
be so easily transposed to a jurisdiction where the Courts 
cannot engage in judicial review of legislation? It is 
important to remember that the concept of “constitutional 
dialogue” was created in Canada, which has an entrenched, 
supreme law Constitution with which all legislation must 
accord.31 Canada has a very different constitutional context to 
that in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, whose 
constitutional model is one of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament 
is omnicompetent. Parliament may legislate without 
restriction on any subject matter because it is not impeded by 
any constitutional laws or an entrenched bill of rights.32 Thus, 
both the New Zealand and United Kingdom Parliaments do 
not have formal restrictions on their powers to legislate.33 So, 
how can “constitutional dialogue” explain a system where 
Parliament dominates over all aspects of governance and 
where the judiciary must always be deferential to 
Parliament’s intentions? 
 
Joseph believes that the concept of “dialogue” can explain 
the Westminster constitutional system. For him, 
parliamentary sovereignty fails to explain the true 
relationship between the political branch (the executive and 
legislature) and the judicial branch of government in a 
Westminster system. Parliament has never been sovereign 
                                               
30 Moonen v Film and Literature Board Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA); R 
v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (NZSC).  
31 Section 52(1) of Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 provides that:  
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
and effect. 
32 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand 
(3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at [1.5.15]. 
33 At [1.5.15].  
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and has never had supreme and undiminished law-making 
power.34 
 
The reality, according to Joseph, is that the political and 
judicial branches are constitutionally interdependent to one 
another. The executive and legislature must look to the 
Courts for judicial recognition of legislative power. Judges 
must look to the legislature and executive for recognition of 
their independence. 35  One branch is not supreme over the 
other. Both branches are ultimately in the business of 
government, and both are committed to the same ends and 
ideals. They achieve these ends and ideals in different ways: 
Parliament through interpretation and the Courts through 
statutory interpretation and common law principles. 36  
Consequently, Joseph argues that the true relationship 
between the judicial and political branches should be viewed 
as a “collaborative enterprise”.37  
 
The concept of “collaborative enterprise” depicts the joint 
functioning of the branches of government. 38  In a 
Westminster democracy, the Constitution is not a power play 
between the political and judicial forces. While the Courts 
defer to Parliament when it comes to decision-making about 
policy matters, they are still part of government. The reality 
is that the Courts accept Parliament’s power to effect legal 
change through legislation and Parliament accepts the 
judicial power to adapt its legislation to the fact patterns of 
litigation.39 This collaborative enterprise is enshrined in the 
rules and practices that define the relationship between the 
two branches.40  
 
The judicial role in a Westminster system is to declare what 
the law is at the time a dispute comes before the Court. This 
                                               
34  Phillip Joseph “Parliament, The Courts and The Collaborative 
Enterprise”(2004) 15 KCLJ 321 at 321-322. 
35 At 322. 
36 At 323. 
37 At 334. 
38 At 334. 
39 At 334. 
40 At 335. 
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is done within a context of “dialogue” between the branches. 
The law changes and adapts through this dialogic process. 
Parliament may legislate on new matters or it might override 
or modify the law in response to judicial decisions. When 
Parliament does this, the Courts adapt their rulings to 
accommodate Parliament’s legislation.41 Essentially, Joseph’s 
collaborative model reconceptualises Hogg and Bushell’s 
“dialogue” for Westminster constitutional theory.42 
 
Joseph argues that parliamentary sovereignty cannot be 
reconciled with the expanded judicial functions under 
modern human rights instruments. For example, the UKHRA 
does not, as many have argued, formally preserve 
parliamentary sovereignty by only giving judges the power to 
issue declarations of incompatibility. Rather, the UKHRA 
marks a development in United Kingdom constitutionalism 
through which Parliament has given the courts the 
responsibility to vindicate the rule of law and to protect 
citizens from unjustified interference. This exercise of power 
sharing shows that the different branches engage in a 
“collaborative enterprise”.43 
 
From Clayton and Joseph’s accounts it is possible to 
understand the interaction between the branches of 
government in Westminster systems through a dialogic lens. 
But have academics picked up on the legitimising function of 
the “dialogue” principle in such systems?  
2 The legitimacy function of “constitutional dialogue”  
Allan has developed “constitutional dialogue” to lend 
democratic legitimacy to the court’s power to judicially 
review administrative action in Westminster systems of 
government. Traditionally, attacks have been made on 
judicial review of administrative action on the basis that it 
unacceptably and improperly permits judicial supremacy. 
Allan conceives of the relationship between the courts and 
                                               
41 At 330. 
42  Petra Butler “It Takes Two to Tango – Have They Learned Their 
Steps?” (August 15 2011) at 1, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com>.  
43  Joseph “Parliament, The Courts and The Collaborative Enterprise”, 
above n 34, at 343-344. 
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legislature when engaging in judicial review of 
administrative action as one of shared sovereignty. In a 
common law legal order the courts and legislatures must 
engage in a “constitutional dialogue” when conducting 
judicial review of administrative action.44 
 
Judicial review of administrative action requires courts to 
look to a situation where the executive agent has carried out 
that power and to resolve whether the power was exercised 
consistent with the agent’s constitutional authority. When 
legislation confers a power to the executive branch of 
government, the legislation sets the constraints as to how that 
power is to be exercised. This legislation draws its meaning 
from its text, read in the light of common law assumptions 
and understandings which include presumptions of 
parliamentary intent. Because Parliament’s legislative powers 
are constrained by principles of constitutional justice and the 
rule of law, the courts assume that Parliament intended the 
ordinary principles of administrative law to apply unless 
there is a legislative indication to the contrary. 45  If, for 
example, Parliament fails to make allowances for fair 
hearings or remedies for abuse of power in the statute that 
confers the executive with a power, the courts will presume 
that Parliament enacted the piece of legislation on the 
assumption that these principles would apply. So, courts are 
not “adding” these principles to the legislation, but see these 
principles as an “intrinsic part” of the legislation.46  
 
Judicial review of administrative action is not, therefore, a 
case of judicial supremacism. Rather it is the legislature that 
is constraining the power of the executive. When the court 
concludes that an action is, for example, illegal or irrational, 
the courts are respecting and applying the legislature’s will, 
but this is subject to boundaries set by constitutional justice 
and the rule of law.47 This is because the grounds for review 
of administrative action do not have substantive content. 
                                               
44 TRS Allan “Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial 
Review” (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 563 at 565. 
45 At 565-566. 
46 At 566. 
47 At 566. 
LAWS526 Research Essay 
 
15 
 
Rather, they describe the existence of an injustice based on a 
reading of the legislation, interpreted in line with 
Parliament’s intention subject to the rule of law.48  
 
So, “constitutional dialogue” legitimises judicial review of 
administrative action in the following way: the judiciary 
respects Parliament’s authority by giving effect to 
Parliament’s intention when reviewing the exercise of 
administrative power and Parliament respects (or at least is 
presumed to respect) the authority of the courts to interpret an 
enactment in line with its intention subject to the limits set by 
rule of law and common law constitutionality.  
3 “Constitutional dialogue” between the judiciary and 
executive 
So far, this essay has explained how “constitutional dialogue” 
occurs between the legislative and judicial branches of 
government. An interesting feature of the discussion of 
“dialogue” in relation to Westminster systems is that 
academics appear to view the executive branch of 
government as also having a role to play in the “dialogue”.  
 
When Joseph uses the idea of “collaborative enterprise” to 
explain the relationship between the branches of government, 
he characterises it as a “dialogue” between the judicial and 
political branches of government. He explains that the 
reference to the political branch recognises the merged 
executive and legislative functions under the Westminster 
system. These functions collapse into one under the principle 
of parliamentary ministry: Ministers of the Crown must be 
members of Parliament and must collectively hold 
Parliament’s confidence.49 So, the executive governs through 
Parliament.50 Thus, Joseph sees the executive as playing a 
role in the “dialogue”.  
 
                                               
48 At 566. 
49  Joseph “Parliament, The Courts and The Collaborative Enterprise”, 
above n 34, at 334. 
50 At 321. 
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Palmer shares a similar view. 51  Palmer believes that 
underlying the concept of the rule of law is the idea that the 
law has an objective meaning independent of the identity of 
the people who made it. For law to have this independent 
meaning, it must be interpreted and applied by someone who 
did not write it. Consequently, a “dialogue” between the law-
maker and the law-interpreter is an inherent part of the rule of 
law: the law-makers make laws, which are interpreted by law 
interpreters, this interpretation is then scrutinised by law-
makers and, if they so desire, is changed, to then be 
interpreted again.52 In a Westminster system, he describes the 
“dialogue” playing out in the following way: in the executive, 
Cabinet Ministers formulate and consider policy proposals 
and have them translated into proposed Bills. In the 
legislature, Members of Parliament consider, amend and pass 
Bills into Legislation. In the judiciary, judges consider 
legislation in the context of a specific dispute. Ultimately, 
Palmer views the interactions as a “dialogue” between 
politicians and judges.53 
 
In addition, Butler notes that the role of the executive in 
“constitutional dialogue” has not really been explored in the 
literature. She considers the executive to be a partner in the 
dialogue in New Zealand, especially in the context of BORA 
because the safeguarding of human rights is the domain of all 
three branches of government. 54  
C Summary 
This section of the essay has first of all sought to show that 
the “dialogue” principle can be used to explain the 
relationship between the branches of government in a 
Westminster system when it comes to the protection of 
citizen’s rights. Second, it has shown that the dialogue 
principle has been adapted to lend democratic legitimacy to 
                                               
51  Matthew Palmer “The Languages of Constitutional Dialogue: 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the People” (Bora Laskin Lecture, 23 
January 2007, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, 
Canada).  
52 At 4. 
53 At 9-10. 
54 Butler “It Takes Two to Tango – Have They Learned Their Steps?”, 
above n 42, at 2. 
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the intervention by the courts into the executive’s exercise of 
decision-making powers. Third, it has explained how the 
executive branch plays a role in the “dialogue”. In doing so, 
this essay has drawn links between the Canadian and 
Westminster constitutional systems. Although the Canadian 
courts have the power to invalidate legislation under a charter 
of rights (a power that the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
courts do not have), the principle that explains and 
legitimises this power does exist in Westminster systems. 
This conclusion that the “dialogue” principle underlies the 
constitutional systems of Canada, the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand will be picked up on in section IV of this essay, 
in which the decision in Spencer v Attorney General is 
discussed.  
III Suspension Orders as a Form of 
“Constitutional Dialogue”  
“Constitutional dialogue” can also occur when the courts 
grant remedies that have implications for the legislature and 
executive, but allow these branches a range of possibilities 
when it comes to crafting a response.55 This section of the 
essay will consider one of these types of remedy: suspension 
orders. It will explain what a suspension order is with 
reference to the approaches taken to this form of relief in 
Canada, South Africa and Hong Kong.  
A Canada 
The Canadian Charter forms the first part of Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982. Section 52(1) of the Act reads: 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, 
and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
or effect. 
Despite this supremacy clause the courts have assumed the 
power to suspend the operation of a declaration of invalidity, 
the effect of which is to grant a period of temporary validity 
                                               
55  Kent Roach “Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues 
about Rights” (Public Law and Legal Theory Research paper No 04-03, 
October 2004) at 12 – 13.  
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to an unconstitutional statute. Consequently, the statute will 
remain in force until the suspension period expires.56 
1 When will suspension orders be granted? 
Suspension orders have their Canadian origin in the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in Re Manitoba Language 
Rights.57 In this case the Court was asked to determine the 
validity of all the laws of the province of Manitoba enacted 
since 1890. Manitoba’s Constitution stipulated that 
Manitoba’s statutes were to be enacted in both French and 
English. In 1890 Manitoba’s legislature enacted the Official 
Language Act. This Act provided that Manitoba’s statutes 
only needed to be enacted in English. Manitoban statutes 
made after 1890 were enacted in English only. But, because 
the Constitution stipulated that the laws must be enacted in 
both English and French, it followed that the laws enacted in 
English-only were invalid.58 The Supreme Court was faced 
with a situation where it would be forced to invalidate all of 
Manitoba’s laws, which could result in a legal vacuum. Its 
solution was to invalidate all of Manitoba’s English only 
laws, but these unconstitutional laws were to be given 
temporary force to allow the legislature time to enact the 
required corrective legislation. This was premised on the 
need to uphold the rule of law.59 
 
Following Manitoba, the Canadian courts assumed the power 
to postpone a declaration of constitutional invalidity and 
began to develop guidelines to govern the remedy’s use.60 In 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Schachter, Lamer 
CJ recognised that this remedy was of a radical character 
because it allows the continued operation of an 
unconstitutional statute and seriously interferes with the 
legislative process because the delayed nullification forces 
the matter back onto the legislative agenda at a time that is 
not of the legislature’s choosing. 61  Chief Justice Lamer 
                                               
56 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)]. 
57 Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] SCR 721. 
58 At [58].  
59 At [112].  
60 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)]. 
61 Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679 at 716-717.  
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consequently ruled that the courts should only suspend 
declarations of inconsistency where the immediate striking 
down of the law would: (1) pose a danger to the public, (2) 
threaten the rule of law, or (3) result in the deprivation of 
benefits from deserving persons.62 
 
Interestingly, these guidelines have largely been ignored in 
subsequent cases. Suspension orders have been granted in 
situations where Lamer CJ’s exigent circumstances have not 
existed.63 For example, in R v Guignard the Supreme Court 
invalidated a bylaw restricting advertising signs from being 
erected outside industrially zoned areas, but allowed the 
order to be suspended to allow time to reconsider the 
bylaw.64 
 
Academics suggest that this shift in approach can be 
explained by the fact that the Schachter guidelines do not 
make room for an appropriate division of labour between the 
branches of government. A new rationale has developed for 
the suspended declaration of invalidity: the idea of 
“dialogue”.65 In many cases where the court has found a law 
to be unconstitutional, the court would prefer the legislature 
or executive to design the appropriate remedy to allow it to 
exercise its policy making functions and provide its own 
remedy to constitutional defects in legislation, including 
remedies that the court could not provide. This encourages 
these branches of government to reflect upon judicial 
decisions and act in good faith to select an appropriate 
response. 66  As a result the suspension of declarations of 
                                               
62 At 719.  
63 See, for example, Re Eurig Estate [1998] 2 SCR 565 at [44]; Cobiere v 
Canada [1999] 2 SCR 203 at [23] and [118]-[119]; Dunmore v Ontario 
[2001] 3 SCR 1016 at [66]; Trociuk v British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 
835 at [43]; Figueroa v Canada [2003] 1 SCR 912 at [93]; Confederation 
des syndicats nationaux v Canada [2008] SCR 511 at [94]; Nguyen v 
Quebec [2009] 3 SCR 208 at [46] and [51]; and UFCW v Kmart [1999] 2 
SCR 1083 at [79]. 
64 R v Guignard [2002] 1 SCR 472 at [32].  
65  Sujit Choudhry and Kent Roach “Putting the Past Behind Us? 
Prospective Judicial and Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 
SCLR (2d) 206 at 222. 
66  Roach “Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues about 
Rights”, above n 55, at 14. 
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invalidity has become an instrument of remedial dialogue 
between courts and legislatures.67 The Court is not avoiding 
its responsibility to uphold the Constitution, because, if the 
legislature chooses to take no action during the period of 
suspension, the Court’s declaration of invalidity will take 
effect. The period of suspension merely gives the legislature 
the first opportunity to remedy the constitutional wrong.68  
 
Yet, this “dialogue” rationale has only been articulated in one 
Supreme Court decision: Corbiere v Canada. In that case 
members of the Batchewana Indian Band sought a 
declaration from the Court that s 77(1) of the Indian 
Act violated s 15(1) of the Charter, which provides for 
equality before and under law and equal protection and 
benefit of law. Section 77(1) provided that only band 
members who ordinarily reside on the reserve were permitted 
to vote in the band elections even though only one third of 
the registered members lived on the reserve. The band 
members were successful, but the Court suspended for 18 
months its declaration that the on-reserve residence 
requirement was unconstitutional.69  
 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé said that there were a number of 
ways in which the constitutional defect could be repaired, and 
the best solution would be one designed by Parliament after 
consultation with the aboriginal people affected. Her view 
was that the principle of democracy should guide the exercise 
of the Court’s remedial discretion, and that principle 
“encourages remedies that allow the democratic process of 
consultation and dialogue to occur.”70 Thus, she held that the 
declaration should be suspended to “give legislators the time 
necessary to carry out extensive consultations and respond to 
the needs of the different groups affected.”71 
 
                                               
67  Kent Roach “Remedial Consensus and Dialogue under the Charter: 
General Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity” 35 UBC 
Law Review 212 at 220. 
68 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)]. 
69 Corbiere v Canada 2 SCR 203 at [24] and [126].  
70 At [116]. 
71 At [118]. 
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So, in the post-Schachter cases the courts have been prepared 
to use suspension orders where there have been a variety of 
solutions available to the competent legislative body to 
correct the constitutional defect. The courts clearly see the 
legislative body as the best judge of the best solution to cure 
the constitutional defect.72  
2 What is the remedial effect of suspension orders? 
Because the courts have been delegating responses to 
constitutional issues to the legislature and executive, there 
has been wide debate on what the nature of the legislative or 
executive response should be. Should the effect of the 
response be both prospective and retroactive, or should it be 
solely prospective? Prior to the advent of the suspension 
order, legislatures made new legal rules with prospective 
effect, while the courts recognised and applied pre-existing 
legal rules with retroactive effect. This distinction has come 
under strain through the use of suspension orders.73 This is 
significant because it has the ability to greatly affect those 
whose constitutional rights have been breached. This is 
illustrated through a comparison of Miron v Trudel74 and M v 
H.75  
 
Both cases involved constitutional challenges to the 
definition of “spouse” in provincial legislation governing 
private financial obligations on the basis that they violated 
the protection of equal rights section of the Charter. In Miron 
a challenge was made to an insurance policy that provided 
accident benefits to spouses. In M v H the challenge 
concerned spousal support obligations. The holdings on the 
merits were the same and the Supreme Court of Canada 
found that the definition of “spouse” in both cases violated 
the Charter. However, the remedial outcomes differed 
radically. The Court in Miron amended the under-inclusive 
legislation by reading un-married common law partners into 
the definition of “spouse”. This had retroactive effect so the 
claimant had a right to claim accident benefits, and this 
                                               
72 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)]. 
73 Choudhry and Roach, above n 65, at 209. 
74 Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418. 
75 M v H [1999] 2 SCR 3.  
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remedy extended to persons in similar situations. In M v H 
the Supreme Court suspended its declaration of invalidity to 
allow the relevant legislative body to address the issue. The 
legislature’s response was to amend the provision but the 
amendment stated that it was to apply with prospective effect 
only. Thus, the litigants in M v H, while successful on the 
merits, were denied a remedy.76 
 
Following these cases, academics have sought to clarify how 
a suspension order should operate in order to address 
potential injustice to successful litigants. Hogg believes that 
when a suspended declaration of invalidity comes into force, 
it has the normal retroactive effect of a court order that 
declares legislation invalid: so it operates to invalidate the 
unconstitutional statute from the time of its enactment. But, a 
suspended declaration of invalidity will not come into force 
at all if the competent legislative body enacts corrective 
legislation to fix the constitutional defect during the period of 
suspension. It therefore follows from the retroactive effect of 
a declaration of invalidity that the corrective legislation must 
be retroactive in effect. If not, then litigants who successfully 
assert their constitutional rights and obtain a declaration of 
invalidity would be left without a remedy.77  
 
Similarly, Choudhry and Roach argue that there should be a 
presumption that remedial legislation has retroactive effect, 
which would encourage legislatures to consider retroactive 
relief for the affected parties. This presumption would allow 
the courts to be loyal to the traditional ideal of retroactive 
justice, while also leaving open the possibility that, in cases 
involving complex social, economic and public policy 
decisions, the legislature can leave the past behind.78 
 
In Canada v Hislop79 the Supreme Court differed from the 
approach suggested by both Roach and Hogg. In that case, 
the claimants challenged the legislative response to the 
Court’s decision in M v H which did not make the benefits 
                                               
76 Choudhry and Roach, above n 65, at 206 
77 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)],  
78 Choudhry and Roach, above n 65, at 252-253. 
79 Canada v Hislop [2007] 1 SCR 429. 
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available to same-sex partners retroactively. The majority of 
the Court stated that the remedial effect of a suspended 
declaration of invalidity was to “facilitate the legislature’s 
function in crafting a prospective remedy” and that “to allow 
the claimants to recover concurrent retroactive relief would 
be at cross-purposes with the Court’s decision to grant a 
suspended declaration of invalidity”.80 
 
Bastarache J in his concurring opinion in Hislop differed 
from the majority on this point. He noted that the question of 
whether to deny a retroactive remedy is different from 
deciding whether to grant a suspended declaration of 
invalidity. He reasoned that a suspended declaration of 
invalidity is ultimately only a temporary limit on retroactivity 
and does not determine whether governments are entitled to 
deny retroactive relief to the claimants when they act to 
remedy the constitutional defect. In order to determine the 
remedy to which a claimant is entitled, the courts should have 
regard to “reasonable reliance, good faith, fairness to litigants 
and Parliament’s role”. Thus, if a legislative response to a 
declaration of invalidity is challenged it is possible for the 
courts to “read in” that the remedy applies retroactively or 
“read down” or “sever” a provision which limits retroactive 
relief.81 However, he agreed with the Majority that this was 
an appropriate case in which the legislature should be given 
the flexibility to make its remedial response prospective 
only.82  
  
Despite Bastarache J’s obiter statements, the position in 
Canada is that the legislative response to a declaration of 
invalidity does not have to apply retroactively. It is up to the 
legislature to decide whether or not to provide a remedy to 
those who have suffered a right’s breach.  
                                               
80 At [92] (emphasis added). 
81 At [161]. 
82 At [164]. 
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B South Africa 
The Canadian innovation of suspended declarations of 
invalidity forms part of the South African Constitution.83 The 
Constitution 84  contains explicit authorisation of suspended 
declarations of invalidity in s 172(1).85 It reads: 
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a 
court 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, 
including 
 … 
 (ii) an order suspending the declaration of 
invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority 
to correct the defect. 
1 When will suspension orders be granted? 
In Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature86 the 
South African Constitutional Court explained that when the 
Constitution came into force there were many old laws on the 
statute book that were inconsistent with the new Constitution. 
If all those statutes were invalidated it would cause a legal 
vacuum. Section 172(1)(b)(ii) was necessary to avoid the 
consequences of a declaration of invalidity where the result 
of invalidating everything done under such legislation is 
disproportional to the harm which would result from giving 
the legislation temporary validity.87 
 
So, when the Constitutional Court had the opportunity to 
consider whether the option of suspension should be 
available for the first time in Coetzee v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa88 Sachs J commented that the court 
should make an assessment on a case-by-case basis as to 
                                               
83 Kent Roach Constitutional Remedies in Canada (2nd ed supplemented, 
Thompson Reuters, Canada, 2013) at [14.1530].  
84 Final Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
85  Roach “Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues about 
Rights”, above n 55, at 14. 
86 Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President, Republic of 
South Africa [1995] (4) SA 877 (CC). 
87 At [107]. 
88 Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa  [1997] (3) SA 
527 (CC). 
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whether “more injustice would flow from the legal vacuum 
created by rendering the statute invalid with immediate effect 
than would be the case if the measure were kept functional 
pending rectification”.89  
 
But like in Canada, the South African courts seem to have 
moved away from solely granting suspension orders to avoid 
creating a legal vacuum. Bishop identifies a number of 
factors that tend to weigh in favour of or against the 
suspension of a declaration of invalidity. The factors in 
favour of suspension are: (1) when the immediate order of 
invalidity would create uncertainty, administrative confusion 
or potential hardship; (2) where multiple legislative cures to 
the constitutional defect exist and it is more appropriate for 
the legislature not the judiciary to make the policy decision as 
to which cure should be realised; and (3) if the deficiency is 
of a purely procedural nature. 90  The factors against 
suspension are: (1) the importance of the right at issue or the 
extent of the violation of that right; and (2) if the Court has 
previously granted a suspension on the same or similar 
issue.91 
 
The second rationale that suspension is appropriate where 
there is a constitutional defect for which multiple legislative 
cures exist is essentially “constitutional dialogue”. Where the 
Constitution does not require a particular outcome, then it is 
for the legislature and not the judiciary to make the policy 
decisions as to which outcome is the best. 92  Thus, the 
“dialogue” rationale appears to be central to the court’s 
decision as to when it is appropriate to suspend a declaration 
of invalidity. This idea will be illustrated by reference to 
three decisions of the South African Constitutional Court. 
 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 93  a provision that 
limited the right of foreign spouses of South African citizens 
                                               
89 At [76]. 
90 Michael Bishop “Remedies” in Stu Woolman and Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed, looseleaf, Juta, 2008) 9-111 at 
[9.4(e)(i)(bb)(x)]. 
91 At [9.4(e)(i)(bb)(y)]. 
92 At [9.4(e)(i)(bb)]. 
93 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs [2000] (3) SA 936 (CC). 
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to reside in South Africa while seeking permanent residence 
status was invalidated by the Court on the basis that it was a 
violation of the constitutional right to dignity.94 O’Regan J, 
when determining the appropriate remedy, said that in this 
situation the legislature was the appropriate body to 
determine the circumstances in which a residence permit 
should be granted because there were a number of 
possibilities that the legislature could have adopted to cure 
the unconstitutional legislation. She emphasised that in 
situations like this the Court should be slow to make choices 
which are more suitable for the legislature to make. 95 She 
suspended the declaration for two years to give enough time 
to the legislature to allow it to rectify the constitutional 
defect.96 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 97  the Constitutional 
Court held that legislation that prevented same-sex couples 
from marrying was unconstitutional. A majority of the Court 
said that the declaration of unconstitutionality should be 
suspended for an appropriate period so as to give Parliament 
the opportunity to correct the defect for a number of 
reasons.98 First, legislation would ostensibly provide a more 
solid foundation for the change in the law and would lessen 
the likelihood of an alteration of the law in the future. 
Certainty was also necessary because a temporary remedial 
measure, such as reading in “husband” to mean “spouse” so 
that the statute gave the ability for same sex couples to get 
married, would not be able to achieve the equality promised 
under by the Constitution: the right for homosexual couples 
to marry represents a major symbolic milestone in 
homosexual rights equality.99 Second, on such a contentious 
social issue, a change in the law would be viewed as more 
legitimate if it were initiated by the legislature rather than the 
courts.100 Third, there were a number of different ways in 
which the legislature could legitimately deal with the gap that 
                                               
94 At [58].  
95 At [63-[64]. 
96 At [65]. 
97 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2006] (1) SA 524 (CC). 
98 At [135]. 
99 At [136]-[137]. 
100 At [139]. 
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existed in the law. On this basis, the Court held that 
Parliament should be given the opportunity to decide how the 
equality rights at issue could be best achieved.101 
 
In Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development102 the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa considered the statutory rape laws to 
consensual sexual acts when both parties are younger than 
the age of consent. The issue was whether it is 
constitutionally permissible for children to be subject to 
criminal sanctions in order to deter early sexual intimacy and 
combat the risks associated therewith.103 The Constitutional 
Court struck down legislative provisions that made it a crime 
for children between the ages of 12 and 16 to engage in 
consensual sexual activity with other children of the same 
age range on the basis that the provisions infringed the rights 
to dignity 104  and privacy 105  and the best interests of the 
child principle.106 Khampepe J was of the opinion that while 
the provisions should be declared invalid, justice and equity 
warranted that their invalidity should be suspended for a 
period of 18 months in order to allow Parliament to remedy 
the defects in the statute.107 Applying Dawood, Khampepe J 
said that the regulation of sexual conduct falls squarely in the 
legislature’s domain. 108  Because the subject matter of the 
impugned provisions, in addition to being policy laden, was 
sensitive and had attracted a high degree of public scrutiny, 
she felt that Parliament was institutionally best-suited to 
ensure that the ultimate statutory regime be decided upon in 
an open manner, with interested parties being given the 
opportunity to shape the solution.109 
 
                                               
101 At [139]. 
102  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development [2014] (2) SA 168 (CC). 
103 At [4].  
104 At [58]. 
105 At [64]. 
106 At [79]. 
107 At [110]. 
108 At [109]. 
109 At [109]. 
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These three examples illustrate that the “dialogue” principle 
greatly influences the court’s decision-making when it comes 
to the relief it grants following a declaration of constitutional 
invalidity. 
2 What is the remedial effect of suspension orders?  
If s 172(1)(b)(ii) is invoked by the court it has the effect of 
making a declaration of invalidity subject to a resolutive 
condition in the sense that if the defect is fixed, the 
declaration falls away and the legislature or executive’s 
response is valid. If not, the declaration of invalidity comes 
into effect at the expiry of the prescribed period, and the 
usual consequences that follow from a declaration of 
invalidity attach to that declaration.110 
 
It is an important principle of South African constitutional 
adjudication that successful litigants should be awarded 
relief. 111  In situations where a declaration of invalidity is 
suspended and the legislature fixes the constitutional defect 
prior to the expiration of the suspension period, the 
declaration ceases to take effect and the litigants do not 
receive any relief. To ensure that this principle of 
adjudication is upheld, the Constitutional Court has the 
ability to grant an interim remedy during the period of 
suspension to diminish the continuing violation of rights. 
This is a power that the Court has exercised fairly 
regularly.112 There are two ways in which the court will do 
this. The first method is for the Court to make an order 
requiring the relevant officials to consider the constitutional 
rights of the effective parties when exercising the temporarily 
validated power.113  The second way is that the court can 
temporarily alter the meaning of the words of the legislation 
to be read in a way that is consistent with the Constitution 
                                               
110 Johan de Waal, Iain Currie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (4th ed, Juta & Co Ltd, Landsowne, 2001) at 184; Executive 
Council, Western Cape Legislature v President, Republic of South Africa 
[1995] (4) SA 877 (CC) at [106]. 
111 S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso [1996] (1) SA 388 (CC) at [32].  
112 Bishop, above n 90, at [9.4(e)(i)(cc)]. 
113 See, for example, Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs [2000] (3) SA 
936 (CC) and Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry 
[2001] (1) SA 29.  
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until the legislature gets around to deciding which option it 
prefers to remedy the constitutional defect.114  
 
What happens when the legislature fails to cure the defect 
and the suspended order comes into effect? In Western Cape 
the Constitutional Court said that in such circumstances the 
declaration of invalidity comes into effect at the expiry of the 
prescribed period and the normal consequences attaching to 
such a declaration ensue.115 However, Bishop notes that this 
is not how the Court has understood suspension orders to 
work in practice following Western Cape. The position 
appears to be that suspended orders will not operate 
retrospectively unless the Court has expressly stated 
otherwise.116 In Mashavha the Constitutional Court felt that 
because the suspension order is based on a need to retain the 
legal position in place in order to avoid disruption of a legal 
system, it will not operate retoractively, primarily because it 
would cause the precise ill that the court intended to avoid.117 
However, it is less clear what should happen where this is not 
the rationale for the suspension order and the Court remains 
silent on retroactivity. In practice it seems that where there is 
uncertainty a person seeking retroactive application of a 
declaration should apply to the Court for clarification on the 
suspended order’s effect.118 
C Hong Kong  
In Hong Kong a distinction is drawn between “suspension 
orders” and “declarations of temporary validity”. These are 
two different types of remedial order that permit 
unconstitutional legislation or policies to continue to operate. 
 
                                               
114 See, for example, Monseke v The Master of the High Court [2001] (2) 
SA 18 (CC) and South African Liquor Traders Association v 
Chairperson, Gauteng Liquor Board [2006] (8) BCLR 901 (CC).  
115 Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President, Republic of 
South Africa [1995] (4) SA 877 (CC) at [106]. 
116 Bishop, above n 90, at [9.4(e)(i)(aa)(y)]. For an example where the 
Court expressly required a suspension order to take retrospective effect 
see Matatiele v President of the Republic of South Africa [2007] (1) CLR 
47 (CC).  
117 Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa [2006] (4) SA 
309 (CC).  
118 Bishop, above n 90, at [9.4(e)(i)(aa)(y)]. 
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The Basic Law is supreme law in Hong Kong. Any law that 
is inconsistent with the Basic Law has no force. The Basic 
Law does not provide for its supremacy in any single 
provision.119 Article 160(1) provides if any law previously in 
force prior to the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region is later discovered to be in 
contravention of the Basic Law, it shall be amended or cease 
to have force in accordance with the procedure as prescribed 
by the Basic Law.120 Article 11 provides that laws enacted by 
the Region’s new legislature cannot contravene the Basic 
Law.121 These provisions do not state the legal consequences 
of inconsistency with the Basic Law,122 but the Court of Final 
Appeal has recognised that the courts have jurisdiction to 
invalidate legislation or executive actions to the extent of any 
inconsistency.123 
 
In Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR124 (Koo) the 
Court of Final Appeal considered the availability of 
suspension orders in Hong Kong. In Koo a constitutional 
challenge was brought against s 33 of the 
Telecommunications Ordinance and an associated executive 
order. Section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance 
authorised the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to order the 
interception or disclosure of telecommunications when 
required by the public interest. 125  In addition the Chief 
Executive published the Law Enforcement (Covert 
Surveillance Procedure) Order requiring covert surveillance 
to be conducted only where authorised at a fairly senior level 
and kept under regular review at an even more senior level.126 
The challenge was based on Article 30 of the Basic Law, 
which guarantees the freedom of privacy and communication 
                                               
119 Kevin Zervos “Constitutional Remedies under the Basic Law” (2010) 
40 HKLJ 687 at 690. 
120 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China, Art 160(1).  
121 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China, Art 11. 
122 Zervos, above n 119, at 691. 
123  Nga Ka Ling and Others v Director of Immigration [1999] 2 
HKCFAR 4 at 25.  
124 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR [2006] 9 HKCFAR 441. 
125 At 450. 
126 At 450.  
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except that the relevant authorities may inspect 
communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet 
the needs of public security or of investigation.127 
 
At first instance, the trial judge found both s 33 and the 
Executive Order to be unconstitutional. 128  He issued a 
“temporary validity order” pending corrective legislation that 
made s 33 and the Executive Order valid and of legal effect 
for a 6 month period. If s 33 and the Order were immediately 
invalidated, law enforcement agencies could not conduct 
surveillance. This would disrupt the protection of law and 
order. The Court of Appeal upheld the “temporary validity 
order”. 129  The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Final 
Appeal to challenge the validity order. The Court asked 
whether a court can make an order according temporary 
validity to a law or executive action which it has declared 
unconstitutional, or alternatively, whether a court can 
suspend a declaration of invalidity so as to postpone its 
coming into operation?130 Interestingly, it treated “temporary 
validity” given to a law or executive action and “suspension” 
of a declaration of invalidity as different concepts. The 
majority of the Court believed that the Canadian courts 
distinguished between these two types of order. This was 
because counsel in argument had made submissions on the 
basis that the Canadian authorities made such a distinction.131 
This is not what the Canadian authorities actually say, which 
will be discussed in section IV of this essay. Despite this the 
Court held that the Basic Law did not preclude the 
availability of either type of order.132  
 
So, what is a “declaration of temporary validity”? The Court 
said that it had two results. First, during the period of 
temporary validity the executive is permitted to function 
pursuant to unconstitutional law. Second, the executive is 
shielded from liability for so functioning. This order is 
                                               
127 At 449. 
128 At 451. 
129 At 451-452. 
130 At 449. 
131 At 459.  
132 At 452. 
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appropriate in circumstances where there would be a legal 
vacuum following an immediate declaration of invalidity 
resulting in chaos. 133  The majority of the Court did not think 
that the situation in Koo could justify temporary validity, but 
did leave open the question of temporary validity being 
available in an extreme case. 134  
 
In contrast, suspension of a declaration of invalidity does not 
provide the executive with a shield from liability. It merely 
allows the executive to act pursuant to the unconstitutional 
law for a specified period of time. The practical effect is that 
in continuing to act pursuant to the unconstitutional law, the 
relevant Government official will not be acting in 
contravention of a declaration of invalidity and so will not be 
in contempt of court for so acting, which would have 
otherwise been the sanction if there were no suspension 
order. But the official will still be acting contrary to the law 
and will incur legal liability for so acting during the 
suspension period.135 The majority identified that the judicial 
power to suspend the operation of a declaration was a 
“concomitant of the power to make the declaration in the first 
place” and was within the inherent jurisdiction of the 
Court.136 It identified the guidelines in the Canadian case of 
Schachter as appropriate instances to grant temporary 
suspension. But ultimately, whether or not to suspend in any 
given case was a question to decide bearing in mind whether 
the danger to be averted by suspension would be of such 
magnitude that suspension of a declaration of 
unconstitutionality would not offend against the rule of 
law.137 
 
In Koo the danger to be averted was of sufficient magnitude 
to justify suspension. The majority replaced the temporary 
validity order with a suspension of the declarations of 
unconstitutionality so as to postpone their coming into 
                                               
133 At 456. 
134 At 456. 
135 Chan Kin Sum Simon v Secretary for Justice [2009] HKEC 393 at 
[64]. 
136 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR [2006] 9 HKCFAR 441 
at 456. 
137 At 457. 
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operation for six months. This would afford an opportunity 
for the enactment of corrective legislation. The Government 
could during the period function pursuant to what had been 
declared unconstitutional, doing so without acting contrary to 
any declaration in operation. But it was not shielded from 
legal liability for so functioning.138 
 
The Hong Kong approach has found favour in the United 
Kingdom. It was adopted by the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court in Ahmed v HM Treasury.139 In that case the United 
Kingdom Treasury submitted that the Supreme Court should 
suspend the operation of the orders it proposed to make 
declaring certain counter-terrorism measures contained in 
Orders in Council ultra vires, which have the immediate 
effect of quashing the Orders. Although the Court believed it 
was inappropriate to grant suspension in that case, drawing 
on Koo, Lord Hope said that it would be wrong to regard the 
suspension as giving any kind of temporary validity to the 
provisions that are to be quashed and there is no shield from 
legal liability for functioning pursuant to what has been 
declared to be ultra vires during the period of the 
suspension.140 
D Comparison of the three approaches 
The essay will now consider how well these three countries’ 
different approaches to suspension orders facilitate 
“constitutional dialogue”. First, it will compare the extent to 
which the courts in each country incorporate the “dialogue” 
principle into their decisions when deciding whether to 
suspend a declaration of invalidity. Second, it will discuss 
how effective each model is at providing a remedy for past 
constitutional breaches that have affected the rights of 
citizens. Third, it will analyse the extent to which the three 
models ensure that, when the provision of a remedy is 
entrusted to the legislature or executive, the remedial 
response of those branches is adequate to protect those rights 
in the future.   
                                               
138 At 458.  
139 Ahmed v HM Treasury (No 2) [2010] UKSC 5; [2010] 4 All ER 829.  
140 At 835.  
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1 Incorporation of the “dialogue” principle in judicial 
reasoning 
In Canada, the courts in most cases have failed to articulate 
that the “dialogue” principle underlies their decision to 
suspend a declaration of invalidity. Of the post-Schachter 
cases none, except for Corbiere, state “constitutional 
dialogue” as the principle that justifies the postponement of 
invalidity. 141  Because these cases deal with important 
constitutional rights, it is necessary for the courts to give 
clear reasons that justify a departure from an immediate 
declaration of validity. If the reason for issuing such 
suspension orders is, as academics have noted, to facilitate 
“constitutional dialogue” then the courts need to make it very 
clear to the legislature and executive that this is indeed the 
rationale behind the suspension. There is a risk that the courts 
would otherwise be indicating to the other branches of 
government that they are being soft on rights breaches. The 
courts need to send a clear message to the other two branches 
that it is not abdicating from its role to uphold the rights and 
obligations contained in the constitution, but rather that, in 
the circumstances, the courts see it as appropriate to allow 
another branch to have the first say in crafting a remedy.  
 
Unlike the Canadian courts, the South African courts have 
made it very clear in several cases that one of the reasons 
why they suspend declarations of invalidity is because the 
remedy required to fix the constitutional defect involves the 
balancing of policy factors, which the legislature and 
executive are better equipped to deal with. “Constitutional 
dialogue” is a key factor that guides the courts’ remedial 
response.  
 
It is also worth acknowledging that the factors identified by 
Bishop that are used to determine whether suspension is 
appropriate are consistent with the “constitutional dialogue” 
principle. When the party responsible for the unconstitutional 
law argues that an immediate order of invalidity will create a 
lacuna in the law that would create uncertainty, 
administrative confusion or potential hardship, the courts are 
                                               
141 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)]. 
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generally suspicious of such an allegation. In the majority of 
cases the court has rejected such claims.142 The courts are not 
quick to shirk from their responsibility to uphold the rights 
and obligations contained in the Constitution. This is clear 
from the fact that, when the extent of the violation of the 
right is so gross that it will not be able to outweigh any 
disruption caused to administration, suspension can never be 
justified. Moreover, when the courts have previously granted 
a suspension order on the same issue they will not postpone a 
declaration. In such situations the court has tried to engage in 
“dialogue” with the legislature or executive and has given 
either branch a fair chance to respond, but they have failed to 
do so. The courts will therefore take the lead to ensure that 
rights are upheld. In addition, the courts are more likely to 
suspend declarations when the defect in the law is purely 
procedural to give the legislature a chance to pass new 
legislation according to the proper procedures. This is a 
pragmatic approach that gives Parliament a fair opportunity 
to remedy the defect in order to continue the enforcement of 
an otherwise rights-consistent law.143   
 
One of the most significant things that distinguishes the Hong 
Kong approach from the Canadian and South African 
approaches is that “constitutional dialogue” does not seem to 
expressly or impliedly enter into the courts decision as to 
whether it should grant either (1) a “suspension order” or (2) 
a “declaration of temporary validity”. Instead, the focus of 
the two types of order is on averting danger.  
 
The decision in Koo has been criticised because the Court of 
Final Appeal did not engage in a discussion of when these 
remedies will be used, except for saying that they will be 
                                               
142  Bishop, above n 90, at [9.4(e)(i)(bb)(x)]; see examples of the 
Constitutional Court refusing to grant suspension where the remaining 
powers are sufficient to prevent a lacuna from arising in Coetzee v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa [1995] (4) SA 631 (CC) at 
[18]; Case v Minister of Safety and Security  [1996] (3) SA 617 at [84]-
[86]; and Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: in Re S v 
Walters and Another [2002] (4) SA 617 (CC) at [76].  
143 See, for example, the approach of the Constitutional Court in Doctors 
for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & others [2006] 
(6) SA 416 (CC) at [214].  
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granted when “necessary”. 144  Academics doubt the 
appropriateness of distinguishing between “suspension 
orders” and “temporary validity orders”. In particular, they 
do not like “suspension orders” because under such orders 
the government incurs liability for engaging in activity that 
the court is willing to tolerate during the suspension 
period.145 If the Court of Final Appeal had based its approach 
on the “dialogue” principle, this argument falls away. If the 
court is issuing a suspension order to facilitate dialogue it is 
not saying that it tolerates the other branches engaging in 
unconstitutional activity. Rather, the court is saying that 
because there are a number of solutions to the problem and 
the choice of the solution involves making complex policy 
decisions, it is not actually competent to come up with the 
solution and so it is deferring this decision to either the 
executive or legislature. The court will give the other 
branches time to come up with a solution. But, under Hong 
Kong’s “suspension orders” the court also recognises that the 
government has wronged people through its unconstitutional 
actions and so the court is going to require the legislature or 
executive to provide a remedy to those who have been 
wronged. 
 
Ultimately, “constitutional dialogue” will be furthered the 
best under all three countries’ approaches when there is a 
clear articulation of the principle as the rationale for 
suspending a declaration of inconsistency because it makes it 
clear to legislatures and governments that the courts are not 
legitimising rights breaches. Instead, all three branches play 
an important role in upholding the constitution.  
2 Remedying past breaches of constitutional rights 
As discussed earlier in this essay, a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Hislop ruled that corrective legislation 
that responds to the suspension of a declaration of invalidity 
does not have retroactive effect. Instead, the legislature’s 
                                               
144 See, for example, Johannes Chan SC “Some Reflections on Remedies 
in Administrative Law” (2009) 39 HKLJ 321 and P Y Lo “Levitating 
Unconstitutional law” (2006) 36 HKLJ 433.  
145 Chan, above n 144, at 332. A similar criticism is made by Zervos, 
above n 119, at 715. 
LAWS526 Research Essay 
 
37 
 
response is prospective. This is because a claimant’s recovery 
of retroactive relief would be at “cross-purposes” with the 
suspension of the declaration of invalidity. There are two 
major problems with this approach.  
 
First, it is clear from the majority’s opinion in Hislop that the 
Canadian approach to suspension orders is not particularly 
effective at providing a remedy to those who have suffered a 
rights breach prior to the passage of corrective legislation. 
Claimants who bring cases before the court will often 
succeed on the merits, but fail to receive any redress for 
themselves. In a study of all the suspension orders issued that 
had resulted in a corrective legislative response prior to 2003, 
only 7 of 27 responses provided any form of remedy to those 
who had suffered previous rights breaches.146  
 
Second, the Hislop majority’s statement that granting to 
claimants retroactive relief “would be at cross-purposes with 
the Court’s decision to grant a suspended declaration of 
invalidity” is incorrect when the rationale for granting a 
suspension order is to facilitate “constitutional dialogue”. In 
such circumstances the court is not saying that suspension 
should be ordered because an immediate declaration would 
otherwise result in legal chaos, but rather, that the legislature 
or executive should have the first shot at crafting a remedy 
because it is better equipped to legitimately exercise 
discretion when it comes to policy making. Providing a 
remedy to those affected by the constitutional defect is not 
inconsistent with deferring the remedial response to elected 
representatives. It would only be at “cross-purposes” if the 
declaration were suspended because it fell within the 
Schachter categories, 147  at which point the presumption in 
favour of retroactivity would be displaced. The Hislop 
Court’s approach is probably to be understood by the fact that 
the Court inexplicably reaffirmed the guidelines set out in 
                                               
146 Choudhry and Roach, above n 65.  
147  To repeat, in Schachter, Chief Justice Lamer held that the courts 
should only suspend declarations of inconsistency where the immediate 
striking down of the law would: (1) pose a danger to the public, (2) 
threaten the rule of law, or (3) result in the deprivation of benefits from 
deserving persons. 
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Schachter without explanation or reference to the previous 
Supreme Court cases, such as Corbiere, that had completely 
departed from those guidelines.148 
 
In South Africa, if a declaration is suspended, the declaration 
falls out of existence when the legislature responds. Similar 
to Canada, this means that there is no obligation on the 
legislature or the executive to make its response retroactive. 
In addition, even when the legislature fails to cure the defect 
and the declaration of invalidity comes into force; there is a 
presumption that the declaration will not act retrospectively 
unless the court says otherwise. This is premised on the 
rationale that it would make no sense to have a suspension 
order act retrospectively when it would cause the precise ill 
that the court intended to avoid. But this is inconsistent with 
“constitutional dialogue”. The idea of “dialogue” is that 
sometimes Parliament is in a better position to remedy the 
constitutional defect than the courts. If the legislature, after 
having had the chance to consider the court’s judgment, has 
chosen to do nothing to fix the impugned law, then the court 
should step in and ensure that not only are the rights and 
obligations of the Constitution upheld, but also that those 
who were affected by the constitutional breach receive a 
remedy.  
 
The measures that restrict the availability of retroactive relief 
to wronged claimants in South Africa are mitigated by the 
availability of interim remedies. Interim remedies ensure that 
successful litigants get some form of relief even if ultimately 
the declaration of invalidity falls away due to an acceptable 
legislative cure to the defect. This addresses the problems 
associated with the Canadian model that suspension orders 
often leave those deserving claimants who have brought the 
rights breach to the attention of the courts without a remedy. 
Furthermore, interim remedies, such as directions to officials 
and temporary alterations of the meaning of words, provide 
useful indications to the legislature as to what appropriate 
cures to the defect might be, which the legislature is free to 
                                               
148 Hogg, above n 10, at [40(1)(d)], 
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adopt when it formulates it solution. This helps to facilitate 
“dialogue”.  
 
Based on the Canadian and South African experience, this 
essay suggests that if the rationale for suspending the order is 
based upon the “dialogue” principle, then the courts should 
make it clear that there is a presumption that Parliament or 
the Government’s response is to be retroactive. However, this 
presumption should be able to be displaced at the discretion 
of the court where there is a risk of legal chaos ensuing 
because of a lacuna in the law. In those cases there should be 
a presumption that the declaration operates retroactively. 
Such an approach would encourage Parliament to actually 
engage with the Court in a dialogue and to take pragmatic 
steps to remedy the constitutional defect. 
 
Interestingly, one of the key criticisms of the Hong Kong 
approach is that there is a doubtful distinction between a 
“temporary validity order” and a “suspension order”. 
Johannes Chan SC writes:149  
 
Be it a temporary validity order or suspension, the practical 
result is the same that an otherwise unconstitutional 
legislative provision is allowed to continue to operate, albeit 
for a definite period of time. In both cases this can only be 
justified on very compelling grounds. Thus, it would be 
difficult to find, conceptually and practically, what difference 
there would be between a temporary validity order and 
suspension. 
 
However, the distinction between the two types of order is 
quite significant because it has the potential to impact upon 
the relief available to the claimants who bring a constitutional 
challenge before the Court. A “suspension order” in Hong 
Kong does not shield the Government from legal liability and 
ensures therefore that at the expiry of the suspension period, 
the Government is liable to compensate any person who was 
harmed as a result of the unconstitutional law. The 
“temporary validity order” seems to operate similarly to the 
Canadian and South African approaches where, if the 
                                               
149 Chan, above n 144, at 332.  
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legislature or executive remedies the constitutional defect, 
then that remedy will only take prospective effect as the law 
is valid up until the expiry of the validity period.  
 
When thought about in terms of “constitutional dialogue”, the 
Hong Kong approach solves many of the problems associated 
with the Canadian and South African models. It is a clever 
solution to have two types of order available because it 
provides the court with a degree of flexibility. “Suspension 
orders”, which would be used more frequently, ensure that 
the declaration of invalidity acts retroactively and provides 
successful litigants with a remedy because claimants can still 
bring claims against the government. However, the court still 
has the power to issue “temporary validity orders” in the rare 
circumstances in which the situation before the court calls for 
a remedy that should only take effect prospectively.  
 
One criticism of this essay’s argument might be that having 
these two types of order does not actually facilitate 
“dialogue” as well as the orders available in South Africa and 
Canada. The Hong Kong model permits the courts to dictate 
to the other branches of government what the nature of the 
remedy should be. But it is necessary to remind these critics 
that the “dialogue” principle acknowledges that the courts 
have a constitutional role to apply existing constitutional 
rules with retroactive relief to the disputes before them. The 
courts perform their constitutional role under the Hong Kong 
approach, while still reserving the power to deny retroactive 
relief through temporary validity orders where they believe 
that the situation is such that legislatures and governments 
should have full discretion to decide how to tailor the 
remedy. Governments under the Hong Kong model will 
know that when a “suspension order” is granted, they should 
incorporate into their response remedial measures for parties 
affected in the past. But when a “temporary validity order” is 
granted, they have full discretion and the legislative response 
is unlikely to be further challenged. Compare this position 
with that of Canada. In Hislop the plaintiffs challenged the 
legislative response on the basis that it lacked retroactive 
effect. Bastarache J reserved the power of the court to read 
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into the legislative response the retroactive effect of 
provisions where the court believes it is appropriate. The 
Hong Kong model facilitates “constitutional dialogue” better 
because it allows the courts to very clearly articulate how 
they have understood the nature of the constitutional right at 
stake and how they believe the other branches of government 
should think about that right in the future. This results in a 
more considered legislative or executive response.  
3 Remedying the constitutional defect for the future 
A significant problem arising from the use of suspension 
orders is that often the remedy crafted by the elected 
branches of government does not effectively address the 
constitutional defect and leaves citizens in a worse off 
position from a rights stand-point than if the court were to 
immediately declare the law invalid. One Canadian case that 
illustrates this potential problem is Dunmore v Ontario.150 In 
Dunmore the Court invalidated a provision excluding 
agricultural workers from Ontario’s labour relations statute, 
but suspended the declaration of invalidity for 18 months to 
allow time for amending legislation to be drafted and 
enacted. 151  The Court took care to specify minimum 
requirements for the remedy so that agricultural workers had 
the statutory freedom to form and maintain associations as 
well as the associated protections for the exercising of these 
rights, such as freedom to assemble.152 The Court abstained 
from requiring more controversial rights in the agricultural 
context such as the inclusion of a full collective bargaining 
regime and the right to strike.153 However, the fact that the 
Court deferred the crafting of a remedy to the legislature left 
the workers vulnerable to the Ontario government’s 
legislative response. The response in the form of the 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act 2002 ignored most of 
what the Court said in Dunmore, which constrained the 
ability of agricultural workers to unionise.154  
                                               
150 Dunmore v Ontario [2001] 3 SCR 1016. 
151 At [66]. 
152 At [67]. 
153 At [68]. 
154 Mary Liston “Delayed Declarations of Invalidity: Deferential Dialogue 
or Justice Deferred?” (paper prepared for the 2005 Canadian Political 
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Carson and Smith identify Dunmore as an example of the 
extent to which dialogue through the use of suspension orders 
can hamper progressive causes that protect and enhance 
constitutional rights. The setting of a minimum remedy by 
the Court, and leaving the response to the legislature to do 
more, gave the legislature discretion in determining how to 
craft legislation in response to the Court’s holding so as to 
facilitate “dialogue”. However, this “dialogue” hindered the 
protection of agricultural workers’ constitutional rights. If the 
Court had gone further so as to require that agricultural 
workers have the same rights as other workers prior to 
issuing the suspension order, the legislative response would 
have been a very different piece of legislation.155 
 
A similar problem arises in South Africa. Bishop explains 
that there is a lack of clarity as to what happens if the 
legislature’s response is not sufficient to address the problem. 
If the response is not acceptable, does the declaration of 
invalidity come into effect? This is not a matter which has 
come before the South African Courts, but theoretically there 
could be subsequent litigation, like there has been in Canada, 
which challenges the remedial response of the legislature. 
Such a challenge could have been made to the legislative 
response to Fourie. The Civil Union Act156 passed by the 
legislature in response to the Court’s suspended invalidation 
of provisions in the Marriage Act 157  did not rectify the 
unconstitutional failure to permit same sex couples to marry 
identified by the Court. This is because it created a separate 
regime different to that of marriage. The Court had 
specifically stated when issuing the suspension order that a 
“separate-but-equal” approach was not sufficient to remedy 
the constitutional defect.158 If the Court had not suspended 
                                                                                                
Science Association Conference, 4 June 2005, University of Western 
Ontario, London, Ontario) at 37. 
155  Jonathan Carson and Charles Smith” “Waiting for the Revolution: 
Democracy, Dialogue and Dunmore” (draft paper prepared for the 2003 
CPSA Meeting, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 2003).  
156 Act 17 of 2006. 
157 Act 25 of 1961. 
158 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2006] (1) SA 524 (CC) at [149].  
 
LAWS526 Research Essay 
 
43 
 
the declaration of invalidity, the immediate effect of the 
declaration in Fourie would have changed the meaning of 
“spouse” in the Marriage Act to permit homosexual marriage. 
So, did the declaration come into effect at the expiry of the 
suspension period because the legislature went against the 
Court’s remedial instructions?159  
 
Fourie illustrates a problematic aspect of suspension orders. 
Sometimes the courts and the legislature do not engage in a 
“dialogue” when the legislature is left to craft the remedial 
response. The legislature may choose to ignore the court’s 
decision and formulate its response based on its own 
perspective of what falls within the boundaries of the 
Constitution. This is worrying when important constitutional 
rights are at stake.  
 
The risk of this issue occurring in Hong Kong is lower due to 
the existence of the two types of orders. The Court is more 
likely to issue a “suspension order” over a “temporary 
validity order” because a “temporary validity order” will only 
be granted where there is a “virtual legal vacuum”.160 Given 
that a government will incur liability during the suspension 
period and be obliged to compensate any citizens wronged at 
the end of the suspension period, it is likely that the remedial 
response would have to generate an adequate response for the 
future from a rights standpoint. This is because the remedial 
response could also be challenged and the legislature or 
government could incur in further liability even after the end 
of the initial suspension period if the court deems the solution 
not to be satisfactory and invalidates it.  
E Summary 
Four conclusions can be drawn from this section of the essay. 
First, the “dialogue” rationale plays an important role in 
guiding the court’s decision to suspend a declaration of 
invalidity in both Canada and South Africa. Although the 
dialogue principle does not guide the decision to suspend in 
Hong Kong, if the rationale behind the types of order were 
                                               
159 Bishop, above n 90, at [9.4(e)(i)(aa)(x)]. 
160 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR [2006] 9 HKCFAR 441 
at 456.  
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“constitutional dialogue”, then this would address concerns 
levied by academics against having two distinct types of 
remedial order.  
 
Second, the “dialogue” rationale is furthered when the courts 
clearly articulate that they are suspending declarations of 
invalidity because it reminds legislatures and governments 
that they also have an important role to play in the protection 
of constitutional rights, especially when the protection of 
those rights includes the balancing of complex policy factors.  
 
Third, if the “dialogue” principle informs the use of 
suspended declarations of invalidity, it would not be 
inconsistent with suspension to provide retroactive relief to 
those who have suffered rights breaches as a result of the 
unconstitutional legislation or executive action.  
 
Fourth, the “dialogue” principle can be undermined where 
the suspension model permits legislative responses to 
suspended declarations of invalidity that do not actually 
remedy the constitutional defect and that do not engage with 
the court’s ruling. A mechanism within the suspension order 
should address this problem.  
IV The New Zealand High Court’s decision in 
Spencer v Attorney General 
The essay will now consider the New Zealand High Court’s 
decision in Spencer v Attorney General (Spencer),161 where 
the Court was required to explore the availability of 
suspension orders in New Zealand for the first time. It will 
analyse Winkelmann J’s discussion of suspension orders in 
the light of the conclusions reached in the previous two 
sections of this essay.  
 
The facts of Spencer are as follows. Mrs Spencer was the 
caregiver of her adult son Paul who suffered from Down’s 
Syndrome. Paul was seriously disabled and unable to care for 
himself. He lived with Mrs Spencer. Mrs Spencer had tried to 
                                               
161 Spencer v Attorney General [2013] NZHC 2580, [2014] 2 NZLR 780.  
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obtain payment from the Ministry of Health for the care that 
she had provided to Paul. The Ministry operated a policy that 
excluded family members from receiving publicly funded 
payment for those caregiving services on the basis that they 
were “natural supports” bound by a social contract between 
families and the state whereby families are not paid for 
looking after their own.162  
 
The policy had been challenged before the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal in Atkinson v Ministry of Health.163  The 
Tribunal is an independent judicial body created by statute. 
Its principal function is to consider and adjudicate on civil 
proceedings brought under the Human Rights Act 1993 
(NZHRA).164 The Tribunal can declare that the Government 
has acted in breach of the anti-discrimination standard 
contained in s 19 of BORA and s 21 of NZHRA. This has the 
effect of making a Government policy unlawful on the basis 
that it is unlawfully discriminatory. 165  In Atkinson the 
Tribunal declared that the policy was inconsistent with s 19 
of BORA because it unjustifiably limited the right to freedom 
from discrimination, family status being a prohibited ground 
for discrimination.166 This finding was upheld on appeal.167  
 
Following the Tribunal’s declaration, the Ministry 
immediately applied under s 92O(2)(d) of the NZHRA for an 
order suspending the declaration. Section 92O(2)(d) provides 
that the Tribunal can make any remedy it grants take effect 
only prospectively. If the Ministry were simply to remove the 
prohibition on funding the employment of family members, it 
would render the existing system chaotic. The Ministry 
needed time to develop a new policy and redesign its 
                                               
162 At 784. 
163  For the Court of Appeal decision see Ministry of Health v 
Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456; for the High Court 
decision see Ministry of Health v Atkinson (2010) 9 HRNZ 47; for the 
Tribunal decision see Atkinson v Ministry of Health (2010) 8 HRNZ 902. 
164 Spencer v Attorney General [2013] NZHC 2580, [2014] 2 NZLR 780 
at 790. 
165 At 790. 
166 Atkinson v Ministry of Health (2010) 8 HRNZ 902. 
167  For the Court of Appeal decision see Ministry of Health v 
Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456; for the High Court 
decision see Ministry of Health v Atkinson (2010) 9 HRNZ 47. 
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disability support services framework in the light of the 
Tribunal’s decision. The Ministry wanted to lawfully apply 
the existing policy while it worked out its new policy. The 
Atkinson plaintiffs consented to a suspension order being 
made. 168  Judge RE Ryan of the Tribunal signed the 
suspension order that suspended the declaration until further 
order of the Tribunal under s 92O of the Human Rights Act. 
The Tribunal did not revisit the order for 3 years.169 
 
Mrs Spencer renewed her earlier efforts to obtain payment 
from the Ministry. The Ministry declined her application on 
the basis that the Tribunal’s declaration had been suspended, 
so the policy continued to operate.170 She applied for judicial 
review of the Ministry’s decision, challenging inter alia the 
validity of the suspension order on the basis that the Tribunal 
did not have jurisdiction to suspend the declaration it had 
made in Atkinson.171  
 
The Ministry argued that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
make the order under s 92O(2)(d). The effect of the order was 
to render the policy lawful while the order remained in place. 
The policy would be declared unlawful at some time in the 
future. Interestingly, it argued that the ability to suspend a 
declaration reflected the “constitutional dialogue” between 
the courts, the executive and legislature.172  
 
Justice Winkelmann held that the Tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction under s 92O(2)(d) to make an order suspending 
the declaration it had already issued, and to backdate that 
order. Section 92O(2)(d) is not on its face a provision that 
authorises a grant of suspension.173 The order made did not 
fit within the terms of s 92O(2)(d). Furthermore, the Atkinson 
plaintiffs could not have consented to the making of an order 
that “suspended” the Tribunal’s finding that the policy was 
unlawful so it would only operate prospectively. This would 
                                               
168 Spencer v Attorney General [2013] NZHC 2580, [2014] 2 NZLR 780 
at 785. 
169 At 789. 
170 At 785. 
171 At 792. 
172 At 792. 
173 At 794. 
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completely go against the Atkinson plaintiff’s intention to 
pursue damages for the past application of the policy. The 
plaintiffs cannot have agreed to wipe away their rights to 
remedies for past breaches.174 This reasoning is undoubtedly 
correct. As discussed in section III, there is a clear distinction 
between “suspending” a declaration of incompatibility and 
the issuing of a prospective remedy. Suspension declarations 
of invalidity can have retroactive effect. It was not possible 
for the provision that the Ministry relied on to be read in that 
way. 
 
Before considering her treatment of suspension orders, it 
should be pointed out that Justice Winkelmann ultimately 
concluded that even if the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to 
make a suspension order, the order was so full of procedural 
defects that it was a nullity.175  
 
Of interest in the case are the additional comments 
Winkelmann J makes about suspension orders. She adopted 
the Hong Kong model of “suspension order” on the strength 
that it had been given support by the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court in the context of judicial review of 
administrative action in Ahmed. 176  She therefore reasoned 
that even if the Tribunal had the power to suspend a 
declaration, this would not render the policy lawful for that 
suspension period and that the Tribunal had no power to 
deem a policy it has found unlawful, lawful. 177 This essay 
will unpack her reasoning on this point. 
 
Justice Winkelmann offers four reasons in support of her 
conclusion. First, she says that “deeming an invalid Act or 
policy valid or lawful is an exceptional remedy, utilised by 
constitutional courts in cases of necessity”. 178  This is not 
necessarily correct. As has been illustrated in section III, the 
Canadian jurisprudence suggests that the courts no longer 
suspend declarations of invalidity solely to prevent a legal 
                                               
174 At 794-795. 
175 At 812. 
176 At 800-801. 
177 At 801. 
178 At 801. 
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vacuum. Rather, the rationale for suspension is aimed at 
facilitating “constitutional dialogue”. A similar approach is 
taken in South Africa. Necessity is not the only accepted 
rationale for granting such a remedy.  
 
Second, Winkelmann J states that, although the Canadian 
cases like Corbiere indicate a more liberal use of “deemed 
invalidity” than the decision in Manitoba, care needs to be 
taken with the Canadian cases because of the different 
context in which they are decided. The remedy, she adds, was 
developed in conjunction with the exercise of a power that 
the courts do not have in New Zealand: the power to 
invalidate an Act of Parliament.179 So, Justice Winkelmann 
acknowledges that the courts in Canada have used suspended 
declarations of invalidity in situations where there was no 
risk of a legal vacuum. She does not, however, outright state 
that there has been a shift in the Canadian approach from 
using the remedy in situations of necessity to using it to 
facilitate “dialogue”. She concludes that this “more liberal 
use” is irrelevant because the constitutional context in New 
Zealand is different.  
 
But is the constitutional context really that different?  Section 
III of this essay has shown that “constitutional dialogue” 
underlies the increased use of suspension orders in Canada. 
Section II has shown that the “dialogue” principle explains 
the relationship between the branches of government and 
lends democratic legitimacy to the review of government 
actions by the courts in Westminster systems. The principle 
of “constitutional dialogue” in New Zealand links its 
constitutional system to that of Canada: both systems share 
the “dialogue” principle that can guide the exercise of 
judicial review powers.  
 
If the underlying rationale for suspension is present in New 
Zealand, can it be said that there is a material difference from 
a dialogic perspective between the power to invalidate a 
piece of legislation and the power to make a policy unlawful 
such that a suspension order can be granted for the former but 
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cannot be granted for the latter? It should not matter that in 
Spencer the impugned act was carried out by the executive 
branch of government as it also plays a role in the “dialogue” 
in Westminster systems.  
 
Justice Winkelmann’s belief that the constitutional context is 
different leads her to consider the Hong Kong approach to 
“suspension orders”, which were considered to be available 
in the Westminster constitutional context by the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court in Ahmed. She accepts the Hong 
Kong approach as the correct position in law. Ironically, this 
remedy had also been developed in conjunction with the 
Hong Kong courts’ power to invalidate legislation 
inconsistent with the Basic Law. 
 
She then makes her third point. Koo and Ahmed stand for the 
proposition that a declaration of invalidity is merely a 
remedy. Even if the declaration is suspended, this does not 
alter what the law is, which is the law pronounced in the 
judgment. But, while it is correct that this is what these cases 
stand for, this proposition of law is based on a misreading of 
Canadian authority.  
 
In the course of argument before the Court of Final Appeal in 
Koo, counsel had said that there was a distinction in 
Canadian law between the concepts of “temporary validity” 
and “suspension” of a declaration.180 Justice Bokhary for the 
majority accepted counsel’s argument. But, in his concurring 
judgment, Mason NPJ did not believe that the Canadian 
authorities distinguished between an order according 
temporary validity to a statute held to be unconstitutional and 
an order temporarily suspending a declaration of invalidity of 
an unconstitutional statute. He referred to Hogg, who makes 
it clear that when the Supreme Court speaks of suspending 
the effect of the declaration the effect is to grant a period of 
temporary validity to an unconstitutional statute, because the 
statute will remain in force until the expiry of the period of 
postponement. Justice Mason did not, however, think that 
this was of significance to the ultimate decision reached 
                                               
180 At 459. 
LAWS526 Research Essay 
 
50 
 
because he did not believe that the circumstances justified 
giving the statute temporary validity.181 A correct reading of 
the Canadian authorities would have revealed that the 
existence of the remedy does affect the law for a temporary 
period.  
 
Furthermore, in Ahmed the United Kingdom Treasury, who 
was seeking the suspension order, did not seek to challenge 
the position in Koo on this basis. Treasury accepted that 
suspension would do no more than delay the taking effect of 
the Court's orders, which would then operate retrospectively 
as from the specified date. It would have no effect 
whatsoever on remedies for what had happened in the past or 
during the period of the suspension.182 Therefore, the Court 
took no opportunity to consider whether or not the foundation 
of the approach in Koo was correct and merely applied its 
ratio as law.  
 
This is not to say that the solution reached in Koo is not good 
from a dialogic perspective. In fact, it addresses a lot of 
problems associated with the Canadian and South African 
approaches. What this essay is saying is that Winkelmann J 
should not have been so quick to dismiss the Canadian 
authority and pronounce that the position in Koo was the 
correct position in law. The distinction that Bokhary PJ 
makes between the types of orders is founded upon a 
misunderstanding of Canadian authority.  
 
Fourth, Winkelmann J states that there is nothing in s 92O 
that empowers the tribunal to confer legality on a policy. 
Section 92O allows the Tribunal to shape the temporal 
application of its orders. It can delay the making of formal 
orders, 183  it can refuse to grant a remedy that has 
retrospective effect,184 or in respect of things that happened 
before the proceedings were commenced or determined,185 it 
                                               
181 At 459-460.  
182 Ahmed v HM Treasury (No 2) [2010] UKSC 5; [2010] 4 All ER 829 at 
[16]. 
183 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92O(2)(a). 
184 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92O(2)(b). 
185 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92O(2)(c). 
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can provide that any remedy granted has effect only from a 
date specified by the Tribunal, 186 or that any retrospective 
effect of any remedy is limited as the Tribunal specifies.187 
As mentioned earlier, the Tribunal is empowered to grant a 
declaration that the defendant has committed a breach of 
BORA or NZHRA. 188  The power to modify the temporal 
application of its orders extends to the issue of 
declarations. 189  Justice Winkelmann concluded that the 
provision allows for the modification of remedies, but not for 
the modification of the substantive law itself. The provision 
does not contemplate that the Tribunal will say: “until this 
date conduct will not be unlawful discrimination but after this 
date it will”. Rather, it contemplates that it will determine for 
what periods of the unlawful discrimination remedies will be 
available.190  
 
The reality is that these powers conferred to the Tribunal 
under the statute allow it to achieve the same practical result 
as if it had the power to make an unlawful policy lawful 
through a Canadian-style suspension order. Even if one 
accepts that the position in Koo and Ahmed is correct and that 
the effect of making a declaration does not render a 
previously lawful policy unlawful, if that declaration is 
suspended, the court will not be acting in contempt of court if 
it continues to operate the policy. This is because the 
Tribunal has not yet declared the position in law. It can delay 
the making of the declaration until a later date at which it can 
limit the retrospective effect of the declaration and provide 
that the declaration takes prospective effect only. The 
Tribunal’s decision at that later date could take into account 
whether the Government had changed the policy before 
formal orders were made and whether that change in policy 
had remedial effect. The Tribunal could even choose not to 
make a declaration at that later stage. While Winkelmann J is 
probably right that there is nothing here that can technically 
                                               
186 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92O(2)(d). 
187 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92O(2)(e). 
188 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92l(3)(a). 
189 Spencer v Attorney General [2013] NZHC 2580, [2014] 2 NZLR 780 
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make an unlawful policy lawful following the issuing of a 
declaration, the Tribunal’s powers when issuing remedies can 
be used in a way that would have the exact same practical 
effect of issuing a suspension order that grants temporary 
validity to the impugned policy. 
 
While these criticisms made of Winkelmann J’s judgment in 
Spencer do not alter the result of her decision (the order was 
defective because of its process) they seek to illustrate that 
her comments that deny the ability of the Tribunal to issue a 
suspension order that would temporarily validate the policy 
are not very compelling.   
 
The Tribunal would be justified using the “dialogue” 
principle when deciding what relief it should grant. Although 
it cannot “suspend” the entering into force of a declaration 
already made or “temporarily validate” discriminatory 
policies, the Tribunal can justifiably be guided by the 
jurisprudence relating to suspension orders of not just Hong 
Kong, but also of Canada and South Africa. This essay 
advocates that when the Tribunal is confronted with a 
situation where an executive policy is inconsistent with the 
anti-discrimination provisions in the NZHRA and BORA, but 
that there are a number of options open to the government to 
fix the discrimination issue, the Tribunal should, on the basis 
of “constitutional dialogue”, suspend the coming into effect 
of a declaration by delaying the making of formal orders. 
This should temporarily allow the body to act pursuant to a 
discriminatory policy while it formulates an alternative one. 
The Tribunal should then wait a specified period of time for 
the government to address the breach at the expiry of which it 
can choose whether to make a declaration. A declaration 
should be issued where the government fails to offer a 
retroactive remedy when such a remedy is justified. As 
section III has shown, the availability of retroactive relief is 
not inconsistent with the dialogue principle. It should also 
issue the declaration where the government’s solution does 
not adequately fix the problem for the future to strongly 
indicate to the Government the Tribunal’s opinion of the 
Government’s response.  
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V Conclusion 
In Spencer v Attorney General Winkelmann J did not follow 
the Canadian jurisprudence when considering the availability 
and effect of suspension orders in New Zealand. This was 
because the Canadian constitutional context was too distinct 
from that of New Zealand. The Canadian courts had 
developed the remedial order in conjunction with the power 
to strike down legislation incompatible with the Canadian 
Constitution. New Zealand courts do not have this power. 
Instead, Winkelmann J drew guidance from Hong Kong 
authority that had been applied to a Westminster 
constitutional system by the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
in Ahmed.  
 
This essay ultimately seeks to argue that there is no reason 
why Winkelmann J should have given limited weight to the 
Canadian jurisprudence when reaching her decision because 
the principle that informs a Canadian court’s decision to 
grant a suspension order, “constitutional dialogue” is equally 
applicable in New Zealand.   
 
Section II of this essay discussed the theory of “constitutional 
dialogue”. It identified that “constitutional dialogue” was 
originally used to lend democratic legitimacy to judicial 
review of legislation in Canada. It then discussed the works 
of various academics who believe that “constitutional 
dialogue” exists in Westminster democracies. In Westminster 
systems, “constitutional dialogue” is able to explain the 
relationship between the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government and lend democratic legitimacy to 
the court’s review functions. The essay drew on Allan’s 
argument that “constitutional dialogue” gives democratic 
legitimacy to the judicial review of administrative action. 
With reference to Clayton and Joseph, it showed that the 
principle also explains the relationship between the courts, 
Parliament and government when issuing declarations of 
incompatibility under instruments such as the BORA or the 
UKHRA to signal to governments when the courts believe 
that legislation is rights-inconsistent. 
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Then, section III of this essay explored how “constitutional 
dialogue” both explains the use of and lends legitimacy to the 
Canadian innovation of suspended declarations of invalidity. 
In particular, it identified the “dialogue” rationale as playing 
an important role in guiding the courts’ decision to suspend 
declarations of invalidity in both Canada and South Africa. 
When considering the approach to such orders in Hong Kong, 
the essay acknowledged that Hong Kong’s courts do not view 
“suspension orders” and “declarations of temporary validity” 
through a “constitutional dialogue” lens. But if the approach 
of the Hong Kong courts to such orders were considered in 
the light of the “dialogue” principle, then this would address 
a number of concerns that academics have levied against the 
availability of two distinct types of remedial order.  
 
Pulling this together, if the principle underlying the decision 
to grant a suspension order in Canada and other countries is 
“constitutional dialogue” and this “dialogue” principle 
explains and legitimises the actions of the different branches 
of government in New Zealand in relation to the constitution, 
then the Canadian jurisprudence concerning suspension 
orders should be highly relevant to a New Zealand court’s 
decision as to the nature and availability of such orders 
domestically. So too should the South African jurisprudence.  
 
Because New Zealand is a jurisdiction of approximately 4 
million people, it does not produce the volume of authority 
needed for the courts to be able to rely solely on domestic 
jurisprudence when determining the outcome of cases.191 In 
addition, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are two of 
only three developed societies that do not have a supreme law 
written Constitution.192 Unlike other developed countries, the 
courts of New Zealand and the United Kingdom do not have 
the power to strike down legislation inconsistent with the 
supreme law. Because of the small pool of domestic 
jurisprudence and the fact that only two other countries have 
a similar constitutional system, New Zealand judges would 
                                               
191  Petra Butler “The Use of Foreign Jurisprudence in New Zealand 
Courts” in Festschrift fuer Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. 
Geburtstag (Staempfli Verlag, Bern, 2011) 305 at 322. 
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be severely limited when ruling on constitutional matters if 
they ignored foreign jurisprudence on the basis that the 
foreign jurisprudence is associated with constitutional powers 
and structures that do not exist in New Zealand. But New 
Zealand courts should still be cautious when seeking 
guidance from such foreign jurisprudence. Therefore, what 
this essay ultimately suggests is that the New Zealand courts, 
when deciding on matters of constitutional law on which 
there is no domestic jurisprudence, should engage in a 
process that looks to the principles informing the judicial 
decision-making on similar subject-matter in the foreign 
jurisdiction. The courts should then ask if that principle forms 
part of the New Zealand legal system. If so, the courts should 
be comfortable in seeking guidance from this foreign 
jurisprudence when ruling on constitutional issues. This is the 
precise exercise that has been carried out by this essay. It is 
also something that Winkelmann J could have done, but did 
not do in Spencer.  
 
At the time of writing this essay, an appeal of Spencer is set 
down to be heard by the Court of Appeal in October 2014. 
What will be interesting to see is whether the principle of 
“constitutional dialogue” and the Canadian or South African 
suspension order jurisprudence will be given a warm 
reception from the Court of Appeal judges.  
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